This paper presents a model on the viability and persistence of open and closed-source productions in the software industry. Starting from some empirical evidences on the organizational diversity that characterizes this sector of the economy, the paper answers one main question: why do open and closed-source productions co-exist? Drawing on a twoways causality between technology and property rights the model shows that: (a) for a sufficiently high degree of technical mellaebility (i.e. high substitutability between production inputs) there exist two asymptotically stable organizational equilibria, namely an open and a closed-source production; (b) the convergence toward one equilibrium rather than the other is affected by the cost advantages of the two productive solutions, including rents and design costs; and (c) in the presence of conflicting interests among developers, there exist a wide range of parameters for which production inefficiency is persistent. The paper adds to the previous literature on free/open-source software in three ways: first, it presents open and closed-source productions as two distinct production systems characterized by a specific combination of technology and property rights; second, it explains the emergence of open-source productions considering also a causality that runs from property rights to technology; and third, it suggests that institutional complementarities can motivate the sustained co-existence of open and closed-source productions despite of their relative (in)efficiency.
Introduction
Economists, since long time, have been interested in the existence of different ways of organizing production (Coase, 1937) . In particular, using as a benchmark the view according to which 'in a competitive economy it really does not matter who hires whom' (Samuelson, 1957, p. 894) , several authors have gradually relaxed the standard assumptions about market completness and discussed the viability and persistence of organizations based on different property rights regimes (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Demsetz, 1966; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Craig and Pencavel, 1992; Dow, 1993; Dow and Putterman, 2000; Pagano and Rowthorn, 1994a; Gintis, 1989; Bowles and Gintis, 1993) . Although such a debate may seem to some extent an out-of-date residual of the economy of "grain and steal", it is not necessarily so. In fact, it turns out that the existence of organizational diversity is an issue that plays a central role in one of the key sectors of the present knowledge economy, namely the software industry.
As it is well known to both scholars and practitioners there exist nowadays two main ways of profitably organizing the production of software: to rely on flat communities of self-selected peer producers that develop software components through an exchange based on non-exclusive copyrights claims; or, to rely on a conventional firm-based production in which one (or few) subject owns exclusive copyrights claims on the software and the workforce is hired and coordinated through managerial hierarchies. The former is addressed at the production of free/open-source software (FOSS) and I will define it as open-source production.
The latter is addressed at the production of closed-source software and I will define it as closed-source production. Despite the fact that both forms of production have existed since long time 1 , none of them seems to effectively prevail in the software industry. Why, then, both open and closed-source productions exist?
In the literature on FOSS (for a detailed review see Rossi, 2006 ) most of the theoretical models dealing with the viability of open-source production have placed particular importance on the specific features of the technology, i.e. the set of tools, processes and procedures used in production. The general approach to the issue, in particular, has been to take as given the technological framework in which open-source productions take place (i.e. the widespread diffusion of the Internet, the low cost of IT and the modularity of code architecture), and to compare the cost advantages that open-source productions can boast with respect to closed-source productions. Examples in this stream of literature include Benkler (2002 ) Johnson (2006 , Baldwin and Clark (2006) and Bessen (2006) among the others.
Looking at these contributions from the perspective of the theory of economic organizations it is clear that, in a more or less explicit way, they represent an adaptation to FOSS production of the standard New Institutional argument for the distribution of organizational rights in the economy. According to this view -see for instance Williamson (1985) -in a world of positive transaction costs and contractual incompleteness, technologies are indeed non-neutral in regard to the nature of property rights. Changes in the characteristics of the production technology alter the nature of the information asymmetries among agents, thereby influencing the nature and attribution of property rights. The latter, in particular, go to the agents that, in because of their intrinsic features, can best economize on transaction costs. When applied to FOSS this line of reasoning marks a point in favor of the viability of open-source productions for two main reasons: first of all, programming is a knowledge-intensive and difficult-tomonitor activity that can be better motivated if agents are residual claimants over the output rather than hired workforce; secondly, software development is a production process that heavily depends on the recombination of others' ideas and the latter, having a marginal cost equal to zero, can be more efficiently exchanged through social sharing than through markets (Benkler, 2002 (Benkler, , 2006 .
Bringing this interpretation to its extreme consequences one should conclude that, if in the present technological paradigm open-source production is relatively more efficient than closed-source production -i.e. the same output can be produced at a lower cost per unit of transaction, the former is inevitably going to displace the latter as the standard way of developing software.
When compared with the actual trends of the software industry, however, this interpretation fails. In particular, it cannot explain three stylized facts. Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution for these four different categories. As it is easy to see most of the software that is distributed as either free/opensource or closed-source in its inception, continues to be distributed under the same licensing terms even today (almost 90% of the total). Such a result is obviously affected by the fact that the most popular free/open-source licenses expressly limit the possibility of "closing" the source code once it is freed. However, even limiting the attention at closed-source software alone, the data is impressive: more than the 90% of the considered software packages exhibits path dependency in the way in which it is developed. Once again this result is inconsistent with the above described arguments concerning the viability of open-source production: Q3 -If, given the technology, open-source production is more efficient than closed-source production, why so few software packages change from the latter to the former?
The aim of this paper is to offer an explanation for the viability and persistence of both open and closed-source productions which is able to account for Facts 1, 2 and 3 above, and that, as a consequence, provides an answer to questions Q1, Q2 and Q3. In particular, it will be argued that the co-existence of these two different organizations of production can be explained by integrating the arguments based on a causality that runs from technology to property rights, with a simultaneous causality that runs from property rights to technology. This, following Pagano (1993) and Pagano and Rowthorn (1994b), amounts at qualifying open and closed-source productions as two distinct organizational equilibira. From this result, two main implications follow: first, the viability of open and closed-source productions is strongly affected by the degree of technical malleability; second, it can well happen that production inefficiency may be asymptotically persistent.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the concept of organizational equilibria and some definitions that will be used in the remaining parts of the paper. Section 3 presents a formalization of the arguments introduced in Section 2 by framing the model presented by Pagano and Rowthorn (1994b) in a two-players game and finds the conditions under which multiple organizational equilibria exist. Such conditions are then used in order to interpret some of the empirical facts outlined above. Section 4 studies the asymptotic stability of these equilibria. This is done, in particular, by assuming that the conditions for the existence of multiple organizational equilibria are satisfied and by inserting the two-players game developed in Section 3 into an evolutionary dynamics with intentional idiosyncratic plays. Section 5 finally concludes.
Orgnanizational equilibria
Ugo Pagano (1993) defines organizational equilibria as situations in which two conditions are simultaneously met: (a) the technological characteristics of the resources used in production bring about a set of rights which is consistent with this technology; and (b) the set of rights brings about technological characteristics of the resources which are consistent with these rights. This concept is developed by integrating two distinct arguments. The first is the standard New Institutional argument according to which technology causes property rights, i.e.
in an organization of production property rights optimally adjust to the characteristics of the resources employed. The second is the so-called "reversed" argument according to which property rights causes technology, i.e. in an organization of production the characteristics of the resources employed optimally adjust to the initial distribution of property rights 7 . When both causalities hold, property rights self-reinforce via technology and vice-versa, and organizational equilibria emerge.
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A more formal definition of organizational equilibrium can be worked out as follows. Define an organization of production as a production system characterized by a specific combination of two domains: the property rights domain R and the technology domain T . Write Π(R, T ) as the profit obtained under a particular organization of production. Then, Definition 1 An organization of production is a an organizational equilibrium if (a) R maximizes Π(R, T ) given T; and (b) T maximizes Π(R, T ) given R.
In order to apply this definition to the study of open and closed-source productions two main aspects need to be clarified. Firstly it is important to notice that, in the domain of property rights, the distinction between open and closedsource production goes beyond the simple licensing terms on the software, so far as to include employment contracts and hardware ownership. In particular, while open-source productions rely on non-exclusive copyrights claims coupled 7 The reversed causality running from property rights to technology as been suggested also by Marglin (1974) , Rowthorn (1974) , Putterman (1982) , Bowles and Gintis (1983) and Bowles (1985) .
8 For a formal discussion of organizational equilibria see Pagano and Rowthorn (1994b) .
with limited use of employment contracts and decentralized hardware ownership, closed-source productions present the opposite characteristics with exclusive copyrights claims combined with extended use of employment contract and centralized hardware ownership (on this point see Benkler, 2006 and {R C , T L } respectively. The question, at this point, is to understand whether they also represent two distinct organizational equilibria. Before moving to for-9 Such differences in the design of the technology has been made clear by Raymond (1999) and his evocative image of the "Cathedral and the Bazaar". For a discussion on the effects of modularity in open-source collaboration see also Langlois and Garzarelli (2008) . For a more general treatment of modularity in decomposable systems see Simon (1962) mal modeling, we can try to address this point by considering the two arguments on the basis of which Definition 1 has been worked out and evaluating how they would explain these two different organizations of production.
Let's start from the New Institutional argument according to which technology causes property rights, and let's consider a relatively modular technology first. In this case one could argue that an open-source regime is likely to emerge because it is more efficient than a closed-source regime, where efficiency depends on two main factors. First, as suggested by Benkler (2002 Benkler ( , 2004 , the presence of commons-based proprietary claims gives way to a system of production that has a lower cost per transaction compared to market or firm-based productions, and has therefore a cost advantage when, as in the case of a modular technology, the number of software modules is high. The main reason for this is that, being based on extended social sharing, self-selection and usage of local knowledge, the former requires a lower degree of formalism and less information exchange in the communication among software developers. Second, as argued by Raymond (1999), in the presence of sufficient technological modularity there is much to gain in terms of software quality by adopting non-exclusive copyrights claims and thus opening the access to the source code at a wide and differentiated community of developers. In relation to the latter point, Hong and Page (2004) have also offered a formal proof of the productivity of collective diversity in modular problem solving. force is hired -as in the case of a closed-source regime, the contract itself and the associated wage can be used in order to extract individual effort and avoid free-riding. Under this regime software modules are likely to be developed and production to take place. On this basis, and differently from before, one could conclude that, once a relatively non-modular technology is given, a closed-source regime instead of an open-source one is likely to emerge.
This way of reasoning, however, can be inverted. Following the so-called "reversed" argument, in fact, it can well be that it is property rights that cause technology, and not the reverse. Let's assume, for instance, that an open-source regime is given in the first place and that technology needs to be designed accordingly. In this case one could argue that the design of a modular technology becomes a key requirement in order to ensure that the software is effectively developed on the basis of two main factors. First, as suggested by Benkler (2002) and Baldwin and Clark (2006) , the presence of a finely-grained code architecture is essential in order to ensure that work is performed on the basis of motivations different from the monetary compensations included in a standard employment contract. Second, as pointed out by Giuri et al. (2008) , the evolution of a polyarchical governance structure is a necessary condition for informal authority to be respected in virtual teams. When both these factors are considered the conclusion goes in the same direction as the one observed above, although in this case the causality is inverted: once an open-source regime is given, a relatively modular technology is likely to emerge.
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But, once again, a similar line of reasoning could be employed also under the assumption that a closed-source regime is given in the first place. In this case the convenience of a relatively non-modular technology can be motivated on two main grounds. First, as argued above, a reduction in the degree of modularity decreases the number of software modules, and therefore it allows the organization to economize on discrete transactions. Second, the presence of a relatively coarsely-grained code architecture combined with a hierarchical governance structure gives to the owner of the exclusive copyrights claim a much stronger control over the software, which can become extremely important especially if the latter has to be placed on the market. On this basis we obtain again the same result observed under the New Institutional approach but a different causal mechanism: once an closed-source regime is given, a relatively non-modular technology is likely to emerge.
Which one of these two approaches to the problem is the correct? Discriminating between them is not an easy task. Most likely, both the New Institutional and the "reversed" arguments are correct. When this is the case, there are reasons to believe that open and closed-source productions qualify as two distinct organizational equilibria. In order to give a formal representation of this result and to find the conditions under which multiple organizational equilibria in software development exist we turn now to a simple model. The results of the model will then be used in order to obtain some insights on the empirical facts outlined in the Introduction.
The model
Let's consider two agents r and t who project to develop a software. In order to do so they need to adopt an organization of production, namely they need to make a choice within two domains of the choice set S: the property rights domain R ∈ S, in which they choose whether to adopt a closed-source regime
and the technology domain T ∈ S, in which they choose the design of the production technology. For the sake of simplicity I restrict the model to a technology with only two design variables: the degree of modularity in the code architecture M ∈ (0, 1), which is measured by the ratio between the number of independent tasks and the total number of tasks performed by the software; and the degree of labor commitment necessary to develop the software modules L ∈ (0, 1), which is measured by the portion of daily time devoted to programming each module (i.e. collection of interdependent tasks). In this framework M and L can be interpreted as two factors of production in the standard economic sense. M and L, in fact, can to a certain extent be considered substitute under the condition that, for a given size of the software, an increase in modularity decreases the size of each software module and therefore reduces the amount of work needed to develop that module. Under this interpretation the nature of a generic technology T j is defined by the factors proportion (or intensity) means that work effort is more cheaply extracted in a closed-source production system than in a open-source production system, where the cost is measured both in terms of monetary expenditure (e.g. the wages paid to the employees hired to work on FOSS projects) and decrease in profit due to unproductive work (e.g. free-riding). The cost function, thus, assume the following form:
where m > l − y and l > m − x. The latter conditions mean that there exist cost advantages in terms of production factors not only between but also within production systems. In addition, I will consider also a second type of costs which are associated with the design of the code architecture. In particular, I
will call d the design cost of modularity which is paid by the agent involved in the design of the production technology, namely (as we will see) agent t.
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The return obtainable from production is modeled in the following way.
Software gives rise to two types of returns: returns from the services sold as complement to the software, which are captured by a function Q(M, L) and are the same independently of the licensing system adopted; and a rent obtainable from the sale of proprietary software which is captured by a function z(R, L)
taking the following form:
where z > 0 captures the positive effects of labor commitment on the rent from software sales. The idea in the latter case is that, by increasing the control over the software of the agents in possess of the exclusive copyrights claims, a greater labor commitment increases the software's marketability. While returns from services are equally shared, the rent from sales is appropriated only by the agent owning the copyrights, in our case agent r. Agents are assumed to be risk neutral and software price is equal one.
Under these assumptions, the payoffs to agent r and t can be respectively written as follows:
Given equations (3) and (4), I model the selection process leading to the adoption of an organization of production as follows. Agents r and t make an independent choice in the property rights and technology domain respectively. To lend some concreteness to the model we can imagine r as being the agent having the original idea about the software and thus deciding how to copyright it, and t as being the engineer designing the technology through which the software is to be produced. In both domains, choices are made in order to maximize payoff, i.e. r will choose the property rights regime that maximizes π r for a given technology (Ass1 ), while t will choose the technology that maximizes π t for a given property rights regime (Ass2 ). Notice that, abstracting from the problem at stake, r stands as representative of the causality mechanism that runs from technology to property rights (the New Institutional argument), while t stands as representative of the causality mechanism that runs from property rights to technology (the "reversed" argument).
In the property rights domain R, given (3), (4), Ass1 and a generic technology T j , r will choose to adopt an open-source regime as long as
, which is the case if and only if:
Similarly, r will choose to adopt a closed-source regime as long as
From equation (5) and (6) the following proposition can be derived:
Proposition 1. In the domain of property rights R, the incremental benefit
from choosing an open-source regime R O (instead of choosing R C ) is greater when a technology characterized by a relatively higher intensity of modularity
Proof. For a given value of x, y and z, consider two technologies T M and T L such that conditions (5) and (6) are simultaneously satisfied, i.e.
Then, it follows directly from (5) and (6) that:
Adding equations (7) and (6) side by side and rearranging, we obtain the fol-lowing relation:
which proves the proposition .
Let's now consider the domain of technology. Under Ass2, t will set M and
Then, from equation (3) and (4) above and under standard assumption about the shape of the marginal product, i.e. ∂ 2 Q/∂M 2 < 0 and
From the latter conditions it is straightforward to derive the following relation:
Relation (12) in turn implies that:
Proposition 2. In the domain of technology T , the incremental benefit from
, is greater when an open-source regime is selected in the domain
Proof. Consider two technologies T M and T L such that conditions (12) is sat-
Then, it follows directly from (12) that:
Adding equations (14) and (13) side by side and rearranging, we obtain the following relation:
Under some continuity conditions of function π(.) and assuming that strat- Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) , Propositions (1) and (2) imply that the game The technological conditions supporting the existence of multiple organizational equilibria in software development can be summarized in the following proposition:
Then in game G there exist only one pure strategy Nash
only an open-source organizational equilibria exists. closely related to the biological theory of "punctuated equilibria" according to which change cannot be approached by individual, gradual modifications, but it requires simultaneous, complementary shocks (Eldredge and Gould, 1972) .
In relation to the present discussion these characteristics imply that: first, to plan a shift from a closed to an open-source production (and vice-versa) is rather complex, because it requires simultaneous changes in different organizational domains; second, in analogy with speciation, the effective emergence of open and closed-source productions is likely to be driven by major institutional shocks followed by period of gradual adjustment. These two points could partially explain the path dependency that we observe in the organization of software development (Fact 3). Moreover, they suggest that credible explanations for the emergence of open-source production should rely on simultaneous shocks occurred both on the technology and property rights domain, e.g. the development of the General Public License (GPL) hand-in-hand with the commercial diffusion of the Internet in the late 80's.
Dynamics and evolutionary stability
In this section I study the asymptotic stability of organizational equilibria. In order to do so I model the dynamics behind the co-evolution of property rights and technology starting from the assumption that multiple organizational equilibria exist. Such a dynamics, in particular, could be useful in order to address two main points: first, why technologically equivalent software get to be steadily produced under different property rights regimes (Fact 2); second, why and how in the presence of multiple organizational equilibria production efficiency may no longer be achieved.
Instead of assuming an exogenous law of motion for both domains R and T , I have chosen to model the co-evolution of property rights and technology by adopting the now-standard evolutionary game theoretic approach (Bowles, 2006; Gintis, 2009) . Besides being rather simple, this approach has the advantage of micro-founding the evolution of institutional forms on a decentralized decision making process based on credible behavioral rules. This is obviously done at the cost of introducing some degree of abstraction, in my case the substitution of a causality mechanism between technology and copyrights with a participatory decision process based on voting.
The structure of the evolutionary game is the following. I consider a large group (or population) of agents of size n, which is divided in two sub-populations r and t of size n r and n t respectively (n = n r + n t ).
13 Once again agents have to choose the organization of production to be adopted in software development, i.e. they play a version of the game described in Section 3. This time, however, the choice does not concern only two agents but the whole group and is based on a voting mechanism. Agents in sub-population r (r-agents) vote in the property } are Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Note: each cell of the matrix identifies a different organization of production; the payoffs reported are the ones that the agents in the two sub-populations would get if production were to take place under each alternative organization of production. standard game theoretic terms each voting option represents a strategy available to agents in their own domain of choice.
Individual votes are expressed on the basis of the payoffs defined by equations (3) and (4) with the exception that this time the net revenue from services is divided over n, while the rent and the design cost are divided over n r and n t respectively. By substituting into equations (3) and (4) the alternatives available in both the property rights and technology domains, we obtain the payoffs matrix reported in Table 1 which defines the stage game. In order to make the problem interesting I assume d ≤ x/ξ where ξ = n/n t . Moreover, I assume m = l.
Under these conditions, the stage game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, namely
is, an open-source organizational equilibrium and {R C , T L }, that is, a closed-source organizational equilibrium. These two equilibria qualify as organizational conventions, meaning that conforming to it is a mutual best response as long as most members of each sub-population (r and t) expect most members of the other to conform to it.
The dynamics of voting is modeled as follows. At the beginning of every time period τ agents express an individual and autonomous vote in their own domain of choice. At τ 0 such votes are exogenously determined by causes not expressly modeled (it can be due to preferences or previous experience). Then, for any τ > τ 0 , each agent updates her vote following the updating process described below.
Once votes are expressed agents are paired across the two sub-populations to compare their individual decisions. To lend some concreteness to the model we can imagine such pairings as being periodic meetings during which "inventors" and engineers discuss the costs and benefits of software production. In the course of such meetings each agent receives two pieces of information. The first one is the distribution of votes in each sub-population. The second one consists of the payoffs reported in Table 1 -i.e. the payoff that each agent would receive if the software were to be developed under each organization of production.
Such payoffs, however, do not immediately translate in individual earnings since production takes place only when "near" unanimity obtains. Writing ρ and ω the fractions of agents voting R O and T M respectively, "near" unanimity obtains when the following conditions hold: ρ < ε or ρ > 1 − ε and ω < ε or ω > 1 − ε with ε > 0 being arbitrarily small, i.e. when only a negligible portion of agents disagrees with the majority in both domains. Once production takes place, agents earn the payoffs associated with the organization of production chosen by the majority, i.e. version 1.0 of the software comes out. In this framework the "near" unanimity condition can be simply interpreted as a managerial rule which ensures that consistent practices are maintained within the group.
The process leading to a change in vote is then modeled as a standard Table 1 the expected payoff to agents voting T M and T L can be written as
Similarly, the expected payoffs to agents voting R O and R C are respectively
These expected payoff functions are reported in Figure 2 , assuming x > y. Once equal to β > 0 times the payoff difference, retaining her own vote otherwise.
While this updating process is not very sophisticated, it may realistically reflect individual cognitive capacities and it ensures that the standard economic assumption of utility maximization is preserved -i.e. each agent votes for the outcome that, given the distribution of vote in the other sub-population, maximizes her expected payoff.
Once this updating process is defined it is easily shown (see Bowles, 2006) that the state of the population, which in any time period τ is given by {ρ τ , ω τ }, evolves according to the following system of replicator equations:
Given equations (20) and (21) we are mainly interested in the stationary states of the population, namely the states for which dρ/dτ = 0 and dω/dτ = 0. Such states qualify as fixed-points of the dynamical system, and as voting equilibria of the population. It is easy to see that dρ/dτ = 0 for ρ = 0, ρ = 1 and ω = ω * , while dω/dτ = 0 for ω = 0, ω = 1 and ρ = ρ * , where Table 1 ) and {0, 0} (corresponding to a closed-source organizational equilibrium, Table 1 ). On this basis, the following holds:
Remark 1. In the evolutionary game correspondent to the stage game G there exist only two asymptotically stable voting equilibria: open-source production,
i.e. {1, 1}; and closed-source production, i.e. {0, 0}.
Under this formulation, there being more than one absorbing state, the dynamic process is non-ergodic, i.e. its long-run average behavior is dependent on initial conditions. If the population starts with a distribution of votes in the area above the dashed downward-sloping line in Figure 3 , i.e. in the basin of attraction of {1, 1}, the population will adopt an open-source production. On the contrary, if the initial state is a point in the area below the dashed line, i.e.
in the basin of attraction of {0, 0}, the population will adopt a closed-source production. While such a dynamics may offer some insights on the reasons why organizations exhibit path dependency in the way in which new software is developed (Fact 3), e.g. their members have formed preferences in favor of one organization of production rather than the other, it does not explain why a specific organization of production is adopted in the first place. In order to address this point we need to transform the dynamical system into an ergodic process and, following Bowles (2006) and Naidu et al. (2010) , I do so by introducing the possibility that agents engage in intentional idiosyncratic plays.
Suppose that every period there is a probability λ ∈ (0, 1) that each agent is selected to undertake an intentional non-best response meant at explicitly influencing the voting process in favor of the organization of production that she prefers, i.e. the one that ensures the greatest individual payoff. This transforms the dynamics into an ergodic process.
If one organization of production ensures to all agents in both sub-populations a payoff greater than the other, once such a organization is adopted no idiosyncratic plays occur and the population will remain in that state forever. In line with the Neo-institutional argument discussed in Section 2, therefore, highly efficient and conflictless organizations of production tend to be favored in the evolutionary dynamics.
The result is different, however, if we consider situations in which there exist conflicts of interest between the agents belonging to the two sub-populations.
Let's consider, for instance, the following parameter ranges:
Looking at the payoff in Table 1 the first three inequalities imply that t-agents
instead that open-source production is more efficient than closed-source production, where efficiency is measured in terms of joint surplus available to the population as a whole. Under these conditions, when the population's state is in the basin of attraction of {1, 1}, the r-agents that are selected for idiosyncratic plays have an incentive to vote for R C because in so doing they may induce their best responding partners to vote T L next period. For the same reason t-agents have an incentive to idiosyncratically vote for T M when the population's state is in the basin of attraction of {0, 0}. The combination of these effects may lead to the "tipping" of the population from one absorbing state to the other. The state at which the population will spend most of the time depends on the amount of non-best responses necessary to induce the best-responding partners to change their strategies, i.e. ω * for sub-population t and 1 − ρ * for sub-population r.
In particular, {1, 1} (and thus open-source production) is relatively persistent if and only if ω * ≤ 1 − ρ * , which is the case when:
where, for the ranges of parameter described by the conditions included in the (24), z * > 0. From this result, it follows that:
Remark 2. In the evolutionary game correspondent to the stage game G, assuming that conflict of interests exists, there exist a z With respect instead to δ and ξ, their impact on the dynamics is less clearcut.
In order to simplify the analysis, I reported in Figure 4 the value of z * (vertical axis) for different combinations of δ and ξ, assuming x = 10, y = 2 and normalizing the size of the population to one (i.e. n = 1). 14 On the horizontal axis is reported the ratio δ/ξ = n t /n r , and the curves are drawn for d = 0.7, 0.5, 0.3.
The graph shows that, if we start from a situation in which the population is Figure 4 : Variation of z * as a function of the ratio n t /n r . Notice that for z ≤ z * open-source is persistent. The curves are drawn assuming x = 10, y = 2, and n = 1. Three different values of d are considered: 0.7, 0.5 and 0.3. As the ratio n t /n r increases, z * presents and inverted-U-shaped behavior, therefore making open-source initially more and then less persistent for any given value of z. composed mainly by r-agent and we progressively increase the ratio n t /n r , z * first increases -therefore making open-source production relatively more persistent for a given z, and then (after a certain threshold) decreases. The reasons behind such a behavior are related to the combination of two main forces that operate as the relative size of the two sub-populations changes. The first force is associated with the effects on the value of the payoffs at the two stable equilibria. As n t increases and n r decreases, in fact, the share of the design cost that goes to each t-agent in the case of open-source production diminishes, while the share of the benefits remains constant (n is fixed). This makes open-source production relatively more attractive. The same, obviously, holds for r-agents, since a reduction in n r increases the share of the rent that would go to each of them in the case closed-source production were to take place. For low value of n t /n r , however, the effect of an increase in n t for t-agents is predominant over a reduction in n r for r-agents, and the range of parameter for which open-source production is persistent enlarges (i.e. z * increases).
After a certain threshold, however, this trend is inverted. As n t and n r begin to have similar dimensions a further reduction in the share of design costs due to an increase in n t is more than offset by the increase in the share of rent that follows a reduction in n r , and z * diminishes. In addition, when n r becomes particularly small there is a second force that starts to play a role against the persistence of open-source production, which is associated with an increase in the voting power of r-agents. For a given level of λ (i.e. the probability that an agent is selected for idiosyncratic play), in fact, the smaller n r , the more r-agents can influence the the voting process in favor of the organizational equilibrium that they prefer, namely closed-source production. Notice that in this model such a power does not depend on their greater ability to coordinate on a common and advantageous position. Rather it is a consequence of the fact that, being small, they experience more "tipping" opportunities.
This inverted-U-shaped behavior of z * with respect to the ratio n t /n r is partially related to the fact that, in this setting, the design of a modular code architecture assumes the characteristics of a quasi-public good. In order to have the degree of modularity which is necessary for open-source production to emerge, in fact, a big initial investment has to be put forward by one part of the population (i.e. the sub-population of t-agents) with the resulting benefits being shared by the population as a whole.
15 Referring to the literature on the theory of economic organizations (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) this result could be interpreted as a version of the "1/n problem" where, as long as n r is too big compared to n t , the marginal cost of modularity is higher than its marginal benefit, therefore making open source production unsuitable. An interesting implication of this result is that the persistence of open-source productions is not affected by the size of n, but rather by the relative size of the two subpopulations.
As a consequence open-source production could still be viable even when a large population of agents is involved, as long as, a sufficiently big portion of agents shares in the cost of software design.
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Equation (25) together with the conditions imposed by the (24) can also be used in order to investigate the relationship between production efficiency and the stability of the different organizational solutions. The following proposition, in particular, summarizes the main finding:
Proposition 5. Suppose that open-source production is more efficient than closed-source production and conflict of interests exists. Assume also n r < n t .
Then, there exist a range of values for the triple (y, z, d) such that closed-source production (despite being inefficient) is relatively persistent. Moreover, such a range is greater the bigger is δ.
Proof. From equation (25) it follows that state {0, 0} (i.e. closed-source pro-duction) is relatively persistent if and only if:
Considering equation (26) jointly with the conditions imposed by the (24), closed-source production can be relatively persistent and inefficient as long as the following holds:
For d = 0, the (27) reduces to
where the closed interval defined by the (28) exists if and only if:
When the (29) holds, the (28) together with the fact that ∂z * /∂d < 0 suffices to proof the first part of the proposition. The second part follows from the fact that ∂z * /∂δ < 0. efficient. The entire curve represents instead z * , so that for any point above such curve closed-source production is relatively persistent. As it is easy to see, so long as z * has a vertical intercept which is lower than x − y (condition (28) above), there exist a whole set of parameter (the shaded area in the graph)
for which closed-source production is at the same time relatively inefficient and persistent.
The fact that some organizations of production in the software industry effectively locate in this area of the graph is difficult to say theoretically, and it turns out to be mainly an empirical question. What Figure 4 shows is the possibility that, under some plausible assumptions, relatively inefficient organizations of production can persist over time, and are in principle difficult to displace by and high design cost of modularity. These points could be interpreted as two different organizations of production that were engaged in software development prior to the digital revolution. At that time technology made it very expensive to design modular platforms, so that a close-source type of production tended to be at the same time efficient and persistent. The economy, as a consequence, exhibited a rather homogeneous nature in terms of organizational demography, with close-source production being the prevailing form (both A and B fall, in fact, in this category).
After the widespread diffusion of the Internet and the huge fragmentation of computational capabilities, however, the design cost of modularity dropped sensibly. At the same time no reform has been introduced on the property rights domain, so that rents were kept close to their initial level. 
Conclusion
This paper tries to explain the sustained co-existence of open and closed-source productions in the software industry. Starting from some empirical facts (Facts 1, 2 and 3), it models open and closed-source productions as two distinct organizational equilibria that co-exist thanks to a two-ways causality between property rights and technology. On this basis the paper makes four main points: first, the organization of software development is strongly affected by the degree of technical malleability, i.e. the degree of substitutability between modularity and labor; second, there exist an institutional complementarity between the property rights and the technology used in software development; third, in the presence of high technical malleability the emergence of different organizations of production in the software industry can be motivated by differences in rent opportunities and design costs; and finally, there exist a wide range of param-eters for which production inefficiency is persistent. The combination of these four points may offer an answer to questions Q1, Q2 and Q3 outlined in the Introduction.
The paper adds to the previous literature on FOSS in three ways. First of all it considers a causality in the emergence of open-source productions that has been often neglected by the previous contributions, i.e. the causality that runs from property rights to technology. Although such an argument is a well known one in social sciences, no author has previously investigated its applicability to software development. This paper fills such gap by the mean of a simple model and obtains as a result a much better sense of the empirical evidence. Secondly, the paper suggests an analogy between the evolution of organizational forms in the software industry and speciation. Similarly to the case of natural species, in fact, open and closed-source productions are presented as entities in which each part of the whole tends to become optimal given the nature of the other parts.
For this reason, the history of their evolution is likely to be "punctuated" by A Appendix - Figure 1 Software 
